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SUPPORTING ACCOUNTABILITY: ASSESSING
THE COSTS OF REGULATION
Julie Goldscheid *
Good afternoon. I would like to start off by thanking all of you
for coming and by congratulating the organizers of the conference, members of the law review, and particularly Louise
Bohmann.1 You have worked so hard to make this conference the
success that it promises to be. Thank you for the opportunity to
participate in this panel and to share the following brief remarks.
In my few minutes, I will pick up on some of the themes that
were mentioned in earlier panels and will focus on ways in which
regulations proposed for nonprofits fail to address the organizational sustainability that is needed to advance underlying regulatory goals. As I review some of the proposed regulatory reforms
and related debates, I am struck by the gap between the general
perception of nonprofits as organizations with seemingly endless
capacity for service delivery regardless of resource capacity and the
increasing demand that nonprofits comport with the quality and
accountability standards applied to the for-profit sector.2 Regulations no doubt are essential in ensuring that nonprofits meet their
missions and provide appropriate oversight, accountability, and
transparency. However, some of the proposed regulations would
impose additional obligations without substantially advancing
those goals.
Increasing pronouncements about the need for additional
oversight, accountability, and transparency raise the question
* Associate Professor of Law, City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law;
B.S., Cornell; M.S.W., Hunter College School of Social Work; J.D., New York University School of Law. Prior to joining CUNY Law School, Professor Goldscheid was a
senior staff attorney and acting legal director at Legal Momentum (formerly the
NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund) and subsequently served as General Counsel of Safe Horizon—an organization committed to victim assistance, advocacy, and
violence prevention—where she oversaw its corporate affairs, policy work, and domestic violence and immigration law projects. The Author extends her thanks to Laura
Steinberg and Jennifer Cheung for their research assistance in preparing these
remarks.
1 Louise Bohmann, Who Profits from Nonprofits? Introduction, 9 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 281
(2006). Ms. Bohmann was the 2005–2006 Symposium Editor of the New York City
Law Review.
2 footnote omitted
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whether the proposed reforms effectively address what most nonprofit organizations, especially small and medium-sized ones, need
in order to operate effectively for the long term. I will talk about
some of the double-binds under which many nonprofits operate
and will pick up on points that Professor Fishman3 discussed concerning common misperceptions of nonprofits. I will put aside for
the moment questions other panelists have addressed of who
should provide particular services—whether it should be the government or nonprofit organizations. Instead, I will focus on the
practical impact of proposed regulations given the realities in
which nonprofits operate.
In analyzing proposed regulations, we should keep in mind
the nature of the majority of nonprofit organizations. Most nonprofits are relatively small. Only 4% have annual budgets of over
$10 million dollars, and nearly three-quarters of nonprofits have
budgets under $500,000.4 Many have infrastructure that bears limited capacity to support extensive accountability functions. For example, many nonprofits have limited staff and/or expertise in
areas such as accounting, fundraising, information technology, and
human resources.5 Others have inadequate physical facilities and
technology.6 It is true that some of the proposed and recently enacted reforms have carve-outs for smaller organizations, with
budget cut-offs ranging generally from $25,000 to $2 million dollars.7 However, the impact of regulation can be substantial even
3 James J. Fishman, The Nonprofit Sector: Myths and Realities, 9 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 303
(2006).
4 INDEP. SECTOR, PANEL ON THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY, GOVERNANCE, ACCOUNTABILITY OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS 11 (2005),
available at http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/final/Panel_Final_Report.pdf.
5 See CTR. ON NONPROFITS AND PHILANTHROPY, URBAN INSTITUTE, GETTING WHAT
WE PAY FOR: LOW OVERHEAD LIMITS NONPROFIT EFFECTIVENESS 1 (2004), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311044_NOCP_3.pdf (describing variations in
infrastructure across nonprofits).
6 Id.
7 Currently, nonprofit organizations with budgets under $25,000 are exempt
from filing Form 990s with the IRS. Tax-Exempt Status for Your Organization, PUBL’N
557, (IRS, Wash., D.C.), Mar. 2005, at 8–9, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p557.pdf. Of the pending and recently enacted reforms, some make no distinction based on organizational size. Tax-Exempt Governance Proposals: Staff Discussion
Draft Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. 8 (2004) [hereinafter Tax-Exempt
Governance Proposals], available at http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/
2004test/062204stfdis.pdf (federal proposal that would require CEO to declare compliance regardless of organization size). Others, however, impose various requirements and fines depending on the organization’s size. See, e.g., California Nonprofit
Integrity Act of 2004, CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12586 (2006) (requiring audit committee
and independent audit of annual financial statements for charities with gross annual
revenues of $2 million or more); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 12 § 8F (2006) (requiring
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when organizations are not technically required to comply. As Professor Fishman has mentioned, some nonprofits have adopted
cumbersome and expensive Sarbanes-Oxley-type regulations even
absent technical compliance requirements.8 Media announcements and public dialog about new nonprofit reform initiatives
may create the impression that all nonprofits are covered by new
regulations even when they are not. Some organizations may find
it prudent to comply in order to best assure funders and other
stakeholders of their commitment to accountability.9
Another challenge derives from the source and type of support on which most nonprofits rely. Overall, 38% of the funding
for the entire nonprofit sector is from dues, fees, and unrestricted
fees for services; 17% is from individual contributions; 31% is from
government grants; and only 3% is from private foundations or
corporate giving.10 Studies show that large nonprofits have the
highest percentage of funding from dues or fees, which generally
are unrestricted funds and can be used for virtually any purpose.11
Smaller nonprofits are much more reliant on foundation and corporate sources, which tend to be in the form of restricted, program-driven grants with little or no funds allocated to
infrastructure support.12
audited financial statement for nonprofits receiving $500,000 in annual support);
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 172-b(1)(2) (requiring filing of various reports by nonprofits receiving over $100,000 and over $250,000 annually); A.B. 7825, 2005 Assemb., 228th Sess.
(N.Y. 2005) (proposal stating that nonprofits with over $2 million in annual revenue
“shall” establish audit committee); INDEP. SECTOR, supra note 4, at 35 (recommending
that nonprofit organizations with over $250,000 in annual revenues have financial
statements reviewed by an independent public accountant, and that those with $1
million or more in annual revenues conduct an audit of financial statements and file
the audited financial statements with the IRS). The Tax-Exempt Governance Proposals
whitepaper suggests doubling fines for failure to file required information against
organizations with over $1 million annual gross revenue and tripling them for organizations with over $2 million annual gross revenue. Tax-Exempt Governance Proposals at
8. The whitepaper also steps-up auditing for organizations when they reach $100,000
and $250,000 annual gross revenue. Id. at 9. For discussion of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act’s impact on nonprofit organizations, see BOARDSOURCE & INDEP. SECTOR, THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 2–10 (2003),
available at http://www.independentsector.org/PDFs/sarbanesoxley.pdf.
8 Fishman, supra note 3, at 311–12; see also, BOARDSOURCE, supra note 7, at 3.
9 For example, the Tax-Exempt Governance Proposals whitepaper recommended uniform “best practices,” suggesting a set of accountability measures that apply regardless
of organization size. Tax-Exempt Governance Proposals, supra note 7 at 14.
10 INDEP. SECTOR, supra note 4, at 12.
11 Alicia Meckstroth & Paul Arnsberger, A 20-Year Review of the Nonprofit Sector,
1975-1995, SOI BULL., Fall 1998, at 153–55, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/20yreo.pdf; accord CTR. ON NONPROFITS AND PHILANTHROPY, supra note 5, at 2-3;
Fishman, supra note 3, at 306 n.12.
12 Meckstroth & Arnsberger, supra note 11, at 155.
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Given these statistics, I am struck by how little the true face of
nonprofit organizations is acknowledged in popular media accounts. The media frequently portrays nonprofits as disorganized,
vulnerable to abuse, and in need of more stringent regulation.13
But the percent of abuse generally is quite small.14 Instead, the
extent to which nonprofits are able to effectively advance their missions and implement financial and other controls is impressive
given the complex realities in which they operate.
My remarks are informed in large part by my experience in
the not-for-profit sector. In particular, I draw on my experience as
general counsel of Safe Horizon, the leading victim assistance and
advocacy organization in the country.15 It operates approximately
eighty programs here in New York City with over 700 staff members
and, as Karen Goldstein16 mentioned this morning, a budget of
approximately $50 million a year. As general counsel, I was responsible for the organization’s compliance with both the letter
and the spirit of the law. This included anticipating the impact
that proposed regulations would have on the organization. That
experience made me acutely aware of the ways that these regulations shape the day-to-day operations of service-delivery organizations.
I was also general counsel during and after September 11.
Safe Horizon was integrally involved in New York City’s response to
that disaster. After September 11, Safe Horizon, as an organization
deeply experienced in working with victims of crime and trauma,
provided concrete support services to victims of the attacks.17 The
organization worked with other key providers such as the American
Red Cross and the Salvation Army to coordinate services and distribute financial assistance to victims.18 It distributed $100 million
in relief funds collected through the New York Community Trust
13

See infra text accompanying notes 21–23; Fishman, supra note 3, at 307–09.
Fishman, supra note 3, at 308.
15 For more information, see http://www.safehorizon.org/ (last visited Dec. 26,
2006).
16 Karen Goldstein, A Practical Perspective on Partnerships Between Government and
Nonprofits, 9 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 287 (2006).
17 Kevin Kinsella, Cash Assistance for Immediate Needs, in FOUNDATION CENTER, SEPTEMBER 11: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE FIELD OF PHILANTHROPY 129–35 (2002) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVES]; Safe Horizon: Easing the Pain of Those Impacted by September 11,
http://www.safehorizon.org/page.php?page=sept11 (last visited Dec. 26, 2006).
18 For a description of the philanthropic response to the 9/11 terror attacks, see
MICHAEL F. MELCHER WITH ALEX MANDL, THE PHILANTHROPIC RESPONSE TO 9/11: A
PRACTICAL ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9–31 (2003), available at http://
www.stblaw.com/content/Practices/Practices57_0.pdf; Tom Seessel, Responding to the
9/11 Terrorist Attacks: Lessons from Relief and Recovery in New York City 2–3, 7–9, 13–17,
14
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and the United Way to victims of the terror attacks.19 That experience brought home the importance of anti-fraud regulation and of
the need for accountability and transparency, particularly when
cash distribution is at stake. As we all know, whenever there is cash,
there is the potential for abuse, and appropriate systems must be
developed to ensure accountability.
The social-service response to the September 11 attacks exemplifies some of the gaps between perception and reality which impacts the debate about nonprofit regulation. I’ll address two
themes that emerge. The first is a lack of general awareness of the
infrastructure limitations under which nonprofits often operate.
The second is a perception that nonprofits are acting irresponsibly
or wastefully when they dedicate resources to administration rather
than programs, and that the public should be suspicious of nonprofits that do not devote nearly all of their budgets to programs
and services.
A few examples illustrate these themes. First, after September
11, there was a tremendous push from all sectors, including the
private sector, to ensure that victims received the support they
needed. As more demands were placed on the nonprofit sector,
the lack of infrastructure in nonprofit organizations came to light.
Those of us who work in nonprofit organizations, particularly those
of small and medium-size, daily reckon with the challenges of providing services notwithstanding limited accounting, fundraising, information technology, human resources, and physical plant
capabilities.20 The gap in resources between the for- and nonprofit
sectors became particularly stark as the two sectors collaborated to
deliver services to 9/11 victims. One striking example emerged
from the efforts to develop a database that would help coordinate
the delivery of financial resources and social services to victims who
might seek services from multiple agencies.21 The purpose of the
24–25, 33, 35, 40-43 (2003), available at http://www.fordfound.org/publications/recent_articles/docs/philanthropic_response_ii.doc; and PERSPECTIVES, supra note 17.
19 Kinsella, supra note 17, at 129, 132. These funds were jointly distributed by the
September 11 Fund, an entity established expressly for that purpose. Richard PerezPena, Service Center Offers Help to the Victims of Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2001, at
B10.
20 CTR. ON NONPROFITS AND PHILANTHROPY, supra note 5.
21 Kinsella, supra note 17, at 133–34; Mitch Nauffts, Regulating Charitable Relief, in
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 17, at 58–61; Victoria B. Bjorklund, Reflections on September 11
Legal Developments, in PERSPECTIVES, supra note 17, at 25–31; see also, e.g., David Barstow, Victims’ Families Lack Voice in Effort to Coordinate Relief, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2001,
at A1; Lena H. Sun, Sept. 11 Charities Plan Central Database, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2001,
at A12; Am. Inst. of Philanthropy, Never Again! Red Cross Needs Policy of Cooperation in Major Disasters, http://www.charitywatch.org/articles/redcrossmarch.html
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database was to streamline the provision of services across the
many organizations throughout New York City that were serving
victims. It sought to enhance coordination by guarding against duplication of services and financial grants, promoting accountability.22 The project was made possible through able and generous
financial and technical assistance from the private sector. However, there was a perceived lag in the time it took to make the
database operational. One question that repeatedly surfaced was,
“Why can’t you get all the nonprofits on board?” It seemed to
many unfathomable that—in 2001—service organizations which
received grants were providing services and giving cash assistance
to people who were affected by the attacks couldn’t all participate
in a common database. But one of the primary challenges was that
some of the organizations providing services did not have computers with sufficient capacity to participate in such a project. The
reality of the disparity in technological capacity produced a moment of complete culture shock. It was unbelievable to those who
operate in the private, for-profit sector that organizations actually
could provide services without a relatively sophisticated computer
system—nevermind high-speed internet access.
A lack of infrastructure can impair nonprofits’ ability to get
the job done and fulfill the organization’s mission. However, despite rhetoric encouraging organizational accountability, efforts to
create the infrastructure that would support such accountability
are not always encouraged. For example, in the aftermath of the
9/11 attacks, the organizations principally responsible for providing services were the target of tremendous criticism.23 Much of this
criticism stemmed from a perception that the funds were not being
distributed quickly enough.24 This criticism failed to recognize
both the challenges posed by a lack of infrastructure and the time
taken to build internal controls to implement accountability, tracking, and anti-fraud measures. One can only imagine what the response would have been if the funds donated for victim
compensation were distributed without accountability measures or
(last visited Dec. 26, 2006). Similar efforts were undertaken in neighboring New
Jersey and other communities.
22 See, e.g., Bjorklund, supra note 21, at 26; Barstow, supra note 21.
23 Barstow, supra note 21; David Barstow, Spitzer Plans to Coordinate Charity Efforts for
Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2001, at B10; David Barstow & Diana B. Henriques, Charity Abundant, but So Is Red Tape, After Terror Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2001, at A1;
David Barstow, $850 Million for Charity, Not Centrally Monitored, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11,
2001, at B1; Janny Scott, Awash in Grief After Attack, Adrift in a Sea of Paperwork, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2001, at A1; Am. Inst. of Philanthropy, supra note 21.
24 Barstow & Henriques, supra note 23.
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anti-fraud devices. It would have been a problem of an entirely
different magnitude and, I think most of us would agree, a much
worse problem than the relatively minor delays that in fact
occurred.
Conflicting messages about regulation often leave nonprofits
in a double-bind. For example, at the same time public opinion
pushes for increased regulation of nonprofits, other messages tell
the public to limit donations to nonprofits that give 100% or close
to that amount of their resources to program—instead of overhead
or administrative—costs.25 But such an approach leaves no room
for resources devoted to accountability. The American Institute
for Philanthropy gives high grades to organizations that spend less
than $25 to raise $100 of funding, a far more reasonable proportion.26 Nevertheless, public touting of “full” funding for services
creates pressure to limit allocation of resources to the infrastructure that may be critical to integrity of services and organizational
longevity.
The rush to judgment about nonprofit organizations’ failure
to adequately respond to the 9/11 attacks in some senses mirrors
common stereotypes of the clients nonprofit organizations serve.
Both are presumed to be incompetent without recognizing the difficulties of accomplishing particular goals when basic concrete resources are lacking: infrastructure in the case of organizations;
basics such as food or shelter in the case of their clients.
These examples raise questions about the fit between the challenges facing many nonprofits and the nature of proposed reforms. A comprehensive discussion of proposed reform is beyond
the scope of my talk today.27 Instead, I will mention some of the
reform proposals in broad strokes. Many of the proposals draw on
the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms imposed on for-profit corporations.28
A substantial number focus on disclosure and would impose requirements such as officer certifications of financial statements’ accuracy and reliability, the filing of audited financial statements,
25 Lee Draper, 100% Goes to Charity?, FOUND. NEWS & COMMENT., Jan./Feb. 2003,
at 33, available at http://www.foundationnews.org/CME/article.cfm?ID=2339 (detailing calls for nonprofits to direct all funds to services and discussing cost of that
approach).
26 Am. Inst. of Philanthropy, Top-Rated Charities According to the American Institute of Philanthropy, http://www.charitywatch.org/toprated.html (last visited Dec.
26, 2006).
27 For a comprehensive discussion of current proposals for reform, see Dana
Brakman Reiser, There Ought to Be a Law: The Disclosure Focus of Recent Legislative Proposals for Nonprofit Reform, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 562–80 (2005).
28 BOARDSOURCE, supra note 7.
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and the establishment of audit oversight mechanisms, such as audit
committees.29 Others would add or amend existing prohibitions
against self-dealing and curb nonprofit executive compensation.30
Many of these proposals—particularly those that require retention
of professional auditors and preparation of reports and filings—
come at no small expense to organizations and run the risk of diverting resources from program needs, even for organizations that
would be compliant with regulations absent the enhanced reporting requirements.31
To the extent that these proposals would provide funding to
support regulatory goals, the funding is directed toward increased
enforcement, not toward building nonprofit infrastructure. For
example, some proposals would increase funding for the IRS or
the Attorney General to enforce the tax laws and the nonprofit
regulation laws.32 Others would help states establish or expand
their education programs, so that states could provide resources
for nonprofit organizations.33 Similarly, some proposals would offer training and education to nonprofit officials.34 The source of
funds for these initiatives is not clear, although one approach
would fund new regulatory initiatives through fees imposed on taxexempt filers.35
My goal today is not to analyze these proposals in any detail.
What is interesting to me is that none of the proposals would increase funding for infrastructure that could, in the long-term, help
29 Brakman Reiser, supra note 27, at 569–80; INDEP. SECTOR, supra note 4, at 33, 35;
Fishman, supra note 3, at 311–12.
30 See, e.g., A.B. 7824, 2005 Assemb., 228th Sess. (N.Y. 2005) (regulating contracts
between a nonprofit organizations and their directors or officers); Tax-Exempt Governance Proposals, supra note 7, at 4–5 (recommending increased scrutiny and regulation
of self-dealing); INDEP. SECTOR, supra note 4, at 61, 66 (recommending penalties for
board members and other nonprofit managers who approve of self-dealing or excess
benefit transactions); Id. at 81 (requiring filing charitable organizations to disclose
whether they have a conflict of interest policy).
31 Brakman Reiser, supra note 27, at 591–92, 593–94, 597.
32 Tax-Exempt Governance Proposals, supra note 7, at 15 (recommending funding enforcement through a tax on net investment income of private foundations or from a
new fee imposed on organizations filing a Form 990); INDEP. SECTOR, supra note 4, at
24 (recommending increased funding for IRS enforcement of charitable organization
regulation).
33 Tax-Exempt Governance Proposals, supra note 7, at 15 (recommending funding to
educate nonprofits and other tax-exempt organizations on best practices); INDEP. SECTOR, supra note 4, at 24 (recommending funding for state oversight and education of
charitable organizations).
34 See, e.g., INDEP. SECTOR, supra note 4, at 21.
35 Tax-Exempt Governance Proposals, supra note 7, at 15 (describing federal government’s proposal).
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nonprofits improve their financial accountability or transparency—
the goals that the proposals ostensibly seek to attain. Even if
budget-based cut-offs adequately exempted small nonprofits from
the letter of the law, the move towards increased financial controls
shifts the norm and will subtly pressure organizations to adopt
these measures. Although in some cases increased oversight may
well be useful or needed, the sweeping move toward increased regulation may be over-inclusive and may impose costs on organizations regardless of their actual benefit. Particularly given the fact
that most nonprofits have budgets under $500,000 and that smaller
nonprofits disproportionately receive restricted funding that may
not be used to support infrastructure or overhead, provisions facilitating the development of appropriate infrastructure could go a
long way toward advancing nonprofits’ long-term sustainability.
Some initiatives are beginning to recognize the need for infrastructure support. For example, recent studies have begun to document the ways that low overhead limits nonprofits’ effectiveness.36
These studies detail the inefficiencies created by inadequate infrastructure, such as the lack of skilled finance staff and the consequences of low salaries for administrative positions.37 They also
show how the restrictions that are the hallmark of corporate and
foundation funding can operate at cross-purposes to organizational efficiency because they make developing strong infrastructures more difficult.38 Commentators and policymakers
increasingly recognize the importance of raising public awareness
about the need to support nonprofit infrastructure.39 Congress recently enacted legislation that would ease the administrative burden of fundraising for organizations seeking federal grants to
provide social and other services.40 Nevertheless, implementation
is slow, and some of the legislation’s primary goals have not yet
36

Draper, supra note 25; CTR.

ON

NONPROFITS

AND

PHILANTHROPY, supra note 5, at

Draper, supra note 25; CTR.

ON

NONPROFITS

AND

PHILANTHROPY, supra note 5, at

Draper, supra note 25; CTR.

ON

NONPROFITS

AND

PHILANTHROPY, supra note 5, at

1–3.
37

1–3.
38

2–3.
39 See, e.g., MARION FREMONT-SMITH ET AL., Charities’ Response to Disasters: Expectations and Realities, in URBAN INST., AFTER KATRINA: PUBLIC EXPECTATION AND CHARITIES’
RESPONSE 1–4 (Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2006), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/311331_after_katrina.pdf; Mark H. Moore, Disasters and the Voluntary Sector: Reflections on the Social Response to Hurricane Katrina, in
MARION FREMONT-SMITH ET AL. supra, at 23–27.
40 Federal Financial Assistance Management Improvement Act of 1999, 31 U.S.C.
§ 6101 (2000) (requiring federal agencies to simplify the process of applying for and
administering federal grants).
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been addressed.41
In conclusion, as we think about future regulation, we should
keep the realities of nonprofits’ resources and abilities front and
center and should think creatively about how to build sustainability
for the long term. I look forward to our discussion.

41 GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GRANTS MANAGEMENT: ADDITIONAL ACTIONS
NEEDED TO STREAMLINE AND SIMPLIFY PROCESSES 3–6, 8–11, 18–26 (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05335.pdf.

